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ACADEMIC HOSTILITY AND SEC
ACQUIESCENCE:
HENRY MANNE'S INSIDER TRADING
David D. Haddockt
Henry Manne was not one of the pioneers in the economics of
insider trading; he was the pioneer. Before Manne, few scholars even
thought the issue worth much serious consideration. A pretty clear
path had been beaten through those woods with no heavy lifting re-
quired-like any other form of theft, it had casually been concluded,
insider trading damaged society by discouraging investment. It
seemed that nobody beyond the inside traders themselves could pos-
sibly benefit, and even they might well be injured in the larger
scheme as the economy as a whole under-performed.
But sometime in the early 1960s as he was contemplating a phe-
nomena recurring repeatedly in the real world, Manne suddenly
asked: "Wait a minute, is the received wisdom really accurate?" Why
does a man do that? Why did Adam Smith's brain tell him one day
that an economy required no central direction?' Why did Ronald
Coase's brain tell him that Pigou was focusing on only half of the
externality problem?2 Why did Henry Manne's brain tell him that
insider trading might improve, rather than retard, the functioning of
an economy? Great ideas seem almost to come to great thinkers un-
bidden. I doubt that Smith, Coase, or Manne themselves could point
to the precise origin of those ideas (if one could understand such a
thing, then everyone could be a Nobel-caliber thinker by merely fol-
lowing a recipe).
t Professor of Law and Economics, Northwestern University. Ph.D. Economics, Uni-
versity of Chicago, B.A. Economics, Oklahoma State University. Research for this comment
was supported by the Arthur J. Seder Jr. Corporate Research Fund provided by a grant from the
American Natural Resources Company.
I See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et a]. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
2 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (positing that in
assessing social costs, the potential harm is reciprocal, and thus the proper question is not how to
restrain A from harming B, but whether A should be allowed to harm B or B should be allowed to
harm A).
See HENRY G. MANNE, INSiDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-110 (1966) (ana-
lyzing the market effect of various trading rules).
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However it happened, Manne had his idea. The true path to un-
derstanding insider trading wound along a difficult route through deep
intellectual woods, not along the easy, thoughtless path that nearly
everyone had been travelling (when they thought of insider trading at
all). After long and careful research, Manne's idea bore fruit in 1966
with the publication of Insider Trading and the Stock Market4 and In
Defense of Insider Trading.5 To this day there remain bitter academic
critics of Manne's work, but no serious scholar who reflects on in-
sider trading dares ignore Manne-the easy path has been forever
closed.
As Macey points out in his commentary in this Symposium,
Manne's point was simply that the opportunity to reap trading profits
motivates insiders to create events on which they can trade. Those
innovative efforts, in turn, can increase the value of the company for
whom the insider works. As Manne well knows, there are other ways
to motivate insiders, but those other ways require active evaluation by
individuals who are not directly involved in any particular innovation,
which is a costly and error-filled process. Moreover, as will become
important below, many of the alternatives can lead to legal disputes
when insiders who feel deserving of benefits are denied them, when
shareholders object to seemingly overgenerous benefits, and so on.
Price function traders who are ignorant of the event that moti-
vates an instance of insider trading may well be induced to sell when
they should have bought, or buy when they should have sold. And
some of those traders may be acting in a way that benefits the firm-
market makers in the company's securities, for example. Those ac-
tions may be diminished by insider trading. But that merely calls into
play a cost-benefit question: are the enhanced efforts of the insiders
worth more to the firm than the diminished efforts of the traders? If
so, the firm's investors should favor insider trading; if not, they
should oppose. Thus, as Manne reformulated the problem, insider
trading is properly a matter of contract between the firm and its insid-
ers, not a desirable sphere for externally-imposed blanket bans.
I will add some detail to two points that Macey raises in his in-
sightful commentary. First, briefly, though insider trading had previ-
ously been a rarely-scrutinized backwater in which hardly any schol-
ars reflected much interest, Manne's temerity in suggesting that the
casual intuition was faulty led to his being ostracized by many law
professors. Why such a close-minded reaction from a group that so
often boasts of its open-mindedness?
4 id.
5 Henry G. Manne, In Defense ofInsider Trading, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at
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Second, and perhaps of more importance, Macey asserts that
(despite continuing hostility in the legal academy) the SEC has es-
sentially adopted Manne's viewpoint. Manne would be the first to
note the paradox. Public choice theory tells us that political institu-
tions rarely alter policy merely because some academic commentator
makes a compelling argument that the prior policy was faulty.6 In-
deed, bureaucrats often scorn academic commentary, which they con-
sider to misunderstand political realities. If the SEC has altered its
policy, then, it is doubtful that it was because Manne critized their
prior policy, but because the preferred policy of the SEC's interest
groups has changed. How does one account for that?
With regard to the first issue, note that vociferous hostility to-
ward Manne's position on insider trading is, and always has been,
limited largely to legal academics. 7 Few observers outside the acad-
emy express any strong viewpoint on either side of the issue. Even
within universities emotional opposition comes almost exclusively
from law schools. Though within economics and finance departments
there remains controversy regarding the proper treatment of insider
trading, Manne's argument that the phenomena ought to be a con-
tractual rather than criminal matter invokes no suspicion of evil in-
tent, as it so often does within law schools.
The explanation, it seems to me, is rather straightforward. How
is any economic activity to be regulated? The two poles are (1) ato-
mistically via the private decisions of the individuals involved, or (2)
centrally via the fiat of experts. Though the real world very often re-
flects a mix of atomistic and central regulation, a stronger tilt toward
the latter clearly increases the demand for expertise. Where does ex-
pertise regarding regulation through the legal system originate? Pre-
dominantly from law schools.
Manne's proposal, in a nutshell, was to get the lawyers mainly
out of the business of regulating insider trading, and to let those di-
rectly involved decide for themselves through contract terms what
regulations were best. It is, in effect, a proposal to reduce the demand
for the services of legal experts, the legal academics directly, and
those who are trained by the academics. Though the average reduc-
tion in demand across all such individuals would be slight, the reduc-
tion facing those who specialized in securities law would be noticed.
6 See generally JAiES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962) (examining how individual decision-making processes affect group decision-making and
rationalist democracy); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 279-94
(1957) (discussing why governments do not consistently act in ways that maximize public welfare).
7 See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Lmv Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
547-49 (1970) (discussing the reception of INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET within
various academic communities).
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Is there really much mystery surrounding the locus of opposition to
Manne's insider trading hypothesis? I think not.
Turn now to the second issue. If, as Macey asserts, SEC policy
today is broadly consistent with Manne's theory, what has turned that
organization in such a direction? Surely it was not the force of
Manne's argument, which, as noted above, is largely irrelevant to bu-
reaucrats due to its academic origins. In this instance, the explanation
is a subtler one.
As Macey and I wrote several years ago, an effective ban on in-
sider trading would increase the returns of market professionals at the
expense of insiders.8 Market professionals are a concentrated interest
group with respect to securities trading as compared to insiders,
whose main activity is running companies, not trading in securities.
Public choice theory teaches that, all else equal, concentrated interests
command disproportionate influence in political markets.9 Thus, if
market professionals would predictably wield disproportionate influ-
ence over securities law, and they would benefit from an effective ban
on insider trading, it would not seem puzzling that the SEC would
compel a ban on insider trading even within firms that might prefer
that their insiders be able to trade on non-public information.
European securities markets have only recently begun to em-
brace any ban on insider trading, and then not enthusiastically. 10 In-
dividually, those economies are small relative to the United States,
and there is greater economic integration within Western Europe than
between Europe and the United States. If, as Manne asserts, banning
insider trading often retards firm performance, then such a ban by one
European nation would induce firms to list their securities on a mar-
ket in a neighboring country which had no similar ban. Market pro-
fessionals in Britain, for example, would not gain from a ban on in-
sider trading; they would lose as their business moved to securities
markets on the Continent. In brief, the greater integration of the
European markets induced Tiebout competition on insider trading
8 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 312 (1987) (ar-
guing that "if one adopts the conventional view that the battle lines of insider trading regulation are
drawn between insiders and ordinary stockholders (or the general public), the SEC would seem to
be channeling wealth that otherwise would be captured by a group with relatively cohesive interests
(the insiders) toward those with extremely weak and diffuse interests (ordinary shareholders or the
general public)") (citation omitted).
9 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L & EON. 211
(1976).
'0 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and
America: The Economics of the Politics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS & THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL
REGULATION 149, 149 (J.-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg and Gran Skogh eds., 1986) (not-
ing that "insider trading is legal in most European countries. A few other European countries have
mild rules constraining insider trading, but those rules have not been enforced actively").
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regulation among European nations,11 and that competition retarded
the imposition of laws similar to those long evident in the United
States.
Until the past decade or so, United States securities markets were
largely isolated from foreign ones. Hence, the U.S. faced little Tie-
bout competition with respect to securities laws. Thus, it was in the
interest of the market professionals in the United States to induce the
SEC to ban insider trading-little of the market professionals' busi-
ness would move abroad, but some trading profits would be diverted
to them from insiders.
But as the ability to trade electronically has rapidly improved,
United States securities markets have become integrated with those of
the rest of the world. If banning insider trading retards the typical
company's performance, new listings will tend to be on securities
markets outside the United States unless the SEC relaxes its posture,
enforcing the ban only when there is reason to believe that the com-
pany involved would desire that result. 12  The Tiebout competition
facing United States securities law has increased. That the SEC in
consequence has relaxed its position on insider trading may not imply
that Henry Manne talked them into it, but it is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that his theory is sound. In short, the SEC's alteration of its
policy probably owes little to Manne's theory, but it is nevertheless
implied by that theory. Manne's theory has thus been empirically
tested, and the evidence does not reject the null hypothesis.
It is difficult to overestimate Henry Manne's contribution to our
understanding of insider trading. It is the very foundation of our
knowledge of the phenomena. It is the basis of all our academic de-
bates on the issue. And it correctly predicted the evolution of SEC
policy in the face of the electronic revolution. Theory, implications,
test; that is the scientific method. It is well past time for the scientific
method to permeate the study of law. Henry Manne has shown the
way.
1 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 . POL ECON.
416, 418-19 (1956) (arguing that mobile citizens will move preferentially toward a community that
better reflects their social, political, or economic preferences).
12 For a discussion of instances in which firms would prefer that insider trading be forbidden,
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Produc-
tion of Information, 1981 SuP. Cr. REv. 309 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Property Rights, Legal Wrongs in Insider Trading, AM. ENTERPRISE, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 57.
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